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Drone Use ‘Outside Areas of Active Hostilities’:
An Examination of the Legal Paradigms Governing US
Covert Remote Strikes
Max Brookman-Byrne1
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Abstract This article examines the use by the US of drone strikes in regions
described as ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ a phrase that appears to
presume the application of international humanitarian law. In response to this,
the article examines these regions to assess whether armed conflicts can be
said to exist, and thereby whether international humanitarian law does in fact
apply. Periods of armed conflict are identified, as are periods which cannot be
characterized as such. Consequently the relevant paradigms of international
law applicable to the strikes are established, belying the presumption that
international humanitarian law applies generally to drone strikes.
Keywords Armed conflict  Drones  International humanitarian law  International
human rights law  Non-international armed conflict  Self-defence targeting
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1 Introduction
Extraterritorial drone1 strikes were first undertaken by the US in 2001 as part of
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.2 Since then, their use has increased
dramatically and includes operations in conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and
Libya, as well as covert operations in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. A large
number of drone strikes have been carried out ostensibly in secret, in places
described by the US government as ‘outside areas of active hostilities’,3 the vast
majority of which are part of the extensive and on-going operations in Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia.
The phrase ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ is curious; it does not reflect
recognized international law pertaining to uses of force or the conduct of
hostilities, but nonetheless implies a temporal and spatial classification of events
in a quasi-legal manner. The idea of forcible actions being ‘outside’ (or,
conversely, ‘within’) implies a link with the notion of armed conflict, a legal
category applied to situations bearing certain specific characteristics, and which
activities can be described as occurring either ‘outside of’ or ‘within’. When an
armed conflict is deemed to exist, the legal paradigm governing the conduct of
hostilities changes. It is almost universally recognized that during armed conflict
States’ international human rights law (IHRL) obligations are to be interpreted
through the lens of international humanitarian law (IHL)4 while, during
peacetime, IHRL obligations are accorded their ordinary meaning. The augmen-
tation of IHRL by IHL occurs either by lex specialis,5 mutual application6 or
1 Variously referred to as remotely piloted aircraft systems, unmanned aerial vehicles or unmanned
combat aerial systems, the term of ‘drone’ will be adopted throughout. Specifically, this article discusses
armed combat drones that are piloted remotely; autonomous systems are outside of the scope of the work.
2 Chamayou (2015), p. 29.
3 Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States
and Areas of Active Hostilities (22 May 2013), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3006440-
Presidential-Policy-Guidance-May-2013-Targeted.html; Summary of Information Regarding United
States Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities (1 July 2016), Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/DNI?
Release?on?CT?Strikes?Outside?Areas?of?Active?Hostilities.PDF; Summary of 2016 Informa-
tion Regarding United States Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities (19 January
2017), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Summary%
20of%202016%20Information%20Regarding%20United%20States%20Counterterrorism%20Strikes%
20Outside%20Areas%20of%20Active%20Hostilities.pdf.
4 A minority view is that IHL displaces IHRL in its entirety, which was the position of the US until 2012
and continues to be the position of Israel. See, for instance, Green (2016).
5 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, paras.
24–25; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 106; IACHR, Coard and others v. United States,
Report No. 109/99, Case No. 10.951 (29 September 1999), para. 142.
6 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), ICJ Reports, p. 200, para. 216; IACHR, Serrano-Cruz v. El-Salvador, Preliminary Objections
(23 November 2004), para. 112; Case of the ‘Mapiripa´n Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment (15 September
2005), para. 115; Case of the Afro-Descendant Communities Displaced from the Cacarica River Basin
(Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, Judgment (20 November 2013), para. 221; ECtHR, Hassan v. United
Kingdom, Judgment, App. No. 29750/09 (16 September 2014), para. 102.
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derogation,7 creating a paradigm of law that is largely less restrictive8 of the use of
force than that outside of armed conflict, meaning that States that are party to
armed conflicts are able lawfully to resort to greater uses of force than would
otherwise be available. In this manner, the classification of ‘armed conflict’ acts as
a gatekeeper between low levels of force, essentially for purposes of law
enforcement, and higher levels of force having a military purpose.
This dichotomy of paradigms between peacetime and armed conflict appears
transcended by US use of the phrase ‘outside areas of active hostilities’. While
certain restrictions, self-imposed by the US, make methods of combat ‘outside areas
of active hostilities’ potentially more restrained than those undertaken in ‘areas of
active hostilities’,9 the phrase obscures the parameters of the concept of armed
conflict, as it is applied to regions in which no attempt has been made to
demonstrate that armed conflicts are occurring. Though official statements on
targeting ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ do not explicitly state that IHL rules are
applied to situations that are not armed conflict, IHL is nevertheless recognized as
the primary corpus of law in these areas,10 suggesting either that the existence of
armed conflict is presumed, or that IHL is being purposefully applied in situations
that do not amount to armed conflict.
Similar sentiment permeates the 2010 speech of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to
the US State Department during the Obama administration, in which he argued that
‘a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not
required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal
force’.11 Elsewhere, the US government juxtaposed lethal targeting within an armed
conflict with that against individuals ‘otherwise targetable in the exercise of national
self-defense’.12 These statements gesture towards an attempt to broaden the
circumstances in which lethal targeting is permitted, allowing military force to be
used outside of armed conflict when the requirements for the lawful resort to force
in self-defence under jus ad bellum are satisfied. This conflation of the jus ad bellum
with IHL is contrary to established law, in which the determination of whether a use
of force is lawful under jus ad bellum has no bearing on the permissible manner in
which hostilities may be conducted.
7 Commentators remain divided as to the nuances of the relationship between IHL and IHRL. See, for
instance, Hill-Cawthorne (2015); Sivakumaran (2012), pp. 89–94; Greenwood (1999), pp. 288–289;
Milanovic´ (2011), p. 124; Scobbie (2010), pp. 456–457; Garraway (2010), pp. 509–510; Sasso`li and
Olson (2008), p. 605.
8 On the shift in perception of IHL from a protective body of law to one that is permissive, see Kretzmer
(2009), pp. 23–31.
9 For instance, asserting that, ‘outside areas of active hostilities’, ‘absent extraordinary circumstance,
direct action will only be taken if there is near certainty that the action can be taken without injuring or
killing non-combatants’; Procedures, above n. 3, p. 1. This is more restrictive than the standard IHL
proportionality requirement, which prohibits collateral damage ‘which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’; see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), ch. 4.
10 Procedures, above n. 3, p. 1.
11 Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’ (Speech at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law 25 March 2010), http://www.cfr.org/international-law/legal-
adviser-kohs-speech-obama-administration-international-law-March-2010/p22300 (emphasis added).
12 Summary 2016, above n. 3.
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The phrase ‘outside areas of armed conflict’ thus forms part of a perceived trend in US
foreign policy towards legitimizing the use of military force outside of armed conflicts, a
palpable manifestation of which is the notion of ‘naked self-defence’,13 or ‘self-defence
targeting’.14 Elsewhere it has been suggested that, if uncontested by other States, US
practice, in carrying out military operations in this manner over the previous decade and
a half, has the potential to encourage the development of customary international law in
support of a broadening of permissible military force outside of armed conflict.15 In the
absence of general practice accepted as law,16 the present author rejects the idea that
such a norm of customary international law is crystallizing, but, nonetheless, it does
appear that actions have been presumed by the US to be governed by IHL without a
determination that they are carried out during armed conflict.
In order to look behind the implicit presumption that IHL is applicable to
operations ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ and to resist the expansion of lawful
uses of military force it is necessary to ask whether drone strikes in regions deemed
‘outside areas of active hostilities’ have in fact occurred within or outside of armed
conflict, thereby confirming the applicable paradigm for assessing their lawfulness.
It is with answering this question that the present article is concerned. Despite the
important implications of this analysis it is an issue that has thus far been
underexplored and so it is anticipated that the present work will greatly aid
subsequent research into the lawfulness of drone use. The assessment of the
lawfulness of specific strikes is beyond the scope of this inquiry, but it is an issue
that remains a pressing concern and on which there is a growing literature.17
This article will first set out the international law governing when armed conflicts
exist, focusing on the criteria for identifying non-international armed conflicts
(NIACs) (Sect. 2). It will then apply these criteria to instances in which drones have
been deployed ‘outside areas of active hostilities’, namely the purported ‘global
NIAC’, as well as the discrete campaigns in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia (Sect. 3).
These regions are focused on as they comprise the principal theatres for lethal drone
operations and have been classified by the US as being ‘outside areas of active
hostilities’, in contrast with Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and, reportedly, Libya,18 which
are recognized as ‘areas of active hostilities’.19 It will be concluded that there have
been reasonably clear periods of NIAC within each State, as well as periods that
cannot be defined as such due to insufficiently intense fighting (Sect. 4). The
13 Anderson (2011), pp. 8–9.
14 Corn (2012).
15 Schaller (2015), p. 227.
16 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(b).
17 See, for instance, O’Connell (2012); Barnidge (2012); Schmitt (2012a); Pejic´ (2014); Gross (2015);
Shah (2015); Heyns et al. (2016).
18 Savage, ‘US Removes Libya From List of Zones with Looser Rules for Drone Strikes’, New York
Times (20 January 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/us/politics/libya-drone-airstrikes-rules-
civilian-casualties.html?_r=0.
19 Summary of Information Regarding United States Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active
Hostilities (1 July 2016), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/DNI?Release?on?CT?Strikes?Outside?Areas?of?Active?
Hostilities.PDF.
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identification of these periods of NIAC allows tentative accounts to be made as to
the number of drone strikes that have occurred within and outside of NIAC,
confirming the legal paradigms applicable and demonstrating that the US was
mistaken in presumptively applying IHL. As a result of this analysis conclusions
will also be made as to the (lack of) normative power of the designation of regions
as being ‘outside areas of active hostilities’.
2 The Legal Nature of Armed Conflicts
2.1 Identifying Armed Conflicts
Armed conflicts may be either international or non-international.20 Under common
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, an international armed conflict (IAC) occurs
in ‘all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties’. Thus, an IAC is a conflict that pits a
State (or States) against another. It is unnecessary to consider IACs presently as US
uses of force in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia have only been against non-State
actors (NSAs), rather than States.21 Therefore, if drone strikes have occurred within
armed conflicts these can only have been NIACs.
There are gradations of NIAC, under common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and under Additional Protocol II (AP II), the latter having a higher
threshold before becoming extant. For present purposes only conflicts arising under
common Article 3 need be considered, as the US is not a party to AP II, meaning
that, even if it intervenes in a NIAC at the request of a State party to AP II, the
Protocol will not apply to US actions. It should be noted that US drone strikes will
nevertheless be subject to customary IHL (CIHL), which is governed by the same
criteria as common Article 3 NIACs.22
Common Article 3 provides no definition of a NIAC, stating only that it applies
to ‘armed conflict[s] not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties’. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) provided a generally accepted test in the Tadic´ case,
defining a NIAC as ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’.23 This has been
interpreted as requiring ‘[t]he existence of organized armed groups’ and ‘fighting of
some intensity’.24 By these criteria, NIACs are distinct from internal disturbances,
20 Geneva Conventions, common Arts. 2 and 3.
21 This conclusion reflects that of the US Supreme Court, which rejected the Bush administration’s claim
that transnational conflict with a NSA was as IAC: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 US 557, 629-631 (2006). As
to the question of internationalized NIACs, see below, Sect. 2.2.
22 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, IT-03-66-T, Judgment (30 November 2005), paras. 88–90 and
92. See also Geiß (2009), p. 133; Kreß (2010), p. 260; Sivakumaran (2012), p. 155.
23 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (2 October 1995), para. 70.
24 International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force, Hague Conference ‘Final Report on the
Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law’ (2010), p. 2.
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‘banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities’25 which,
as long as they are ‘isolated and sporadic’, may cause ‘incalculable human fatalities
and/or colossal damage to property’ but will nevertheless remain outside the scope
of IHL.26
The intensity threshold is ‘dynamic’,27 the notion of ‘protracted armed violence’
suggesting a durational requirement, while the term ‘large-scale’ in the same
paragraph28 points to a requirement of magnitude.29 This balance between duration
and magnitude manifested in the La Tablada case, in which a NIAC was identified
due to the intensity of fighting, despite it lasting only 30 hours.30 Ad hoc tribunals
have provided indicative factors demonstrative of intensity, including number of
deaths, casualties and buildings destroyed,31 duration,32 the involvement of bodies
like the UN Security Council33 and the geographical scope of the conflict.34
Additional factors include mobilization of volunteers,35 distribution of weapons,36
the nature of weapons used,37 and the manner of governmental response38 (for
instance, resort to the armed forces rather than police39). These factors are indicative
and need not be cumulatively satisfied: the absence of one will not definitively
negate the existence of a NIAC.40
Indicative criteria have also been provided to evidence requisite organization
and, like the intensity requirement, no single characteristic is ‘essential to establish
whether the ‘‘organization’’ criterion is fulfilled’.41 These include ‘the existence of
25 Prosecutor v. Milosˇevic´, IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (16 June 2004),
para. 26.
26 Dinstein (2014), p. 21.
27 ILA, above n. 24, p. 30.
28 Tadic´, above n. 23, para. 70.
29 Sivakumaran (2012), p. 167.
30 IACHR, Abella v. Argentina, Report No. 55/97, Case No. 11.137 (30 October 1997), paras. 147 and
155.
31 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment (7 May 1997), paras. 565-566;
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Confirmation of Charges (29 January 2007),
para. 235; Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Mucic´, Delic´ and Landzˇo, IT-96-21-T, Judgment (16 November 1998),
para. 189; Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 28; Limaj, above n. 22, paras. 135, 138 and 141; Prosecutor v.
Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, I-04-84-T, Judgment (3 April 2008), para. 49; Prosecutor v. Bosˇkoski
and Tarcˇulovski, IT-04-82-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (10 July 2008), para. 177.
32 Tadic´, above n. 31, para. 565; Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 28.
33 Tadic´, above n. 31, para. 567; Dyilo, above n. 31, para. 235; Delalic´, above n. 31, para. 190;
Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 49; Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 177.
34 Tadic´, above n. 31, para. 566; Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 29.
35 Delalic´, above n. 31, para. 188.
36 Delalic´, above n. 31, para. 188; Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 31.
37 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 31; Limaj, above n. 22, para. 136; Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 49;
Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 177.
38 Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 178.
39 Abella, above n. 30, para. 155.
40 Sivakumaran (2012), para. 168.
41 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 60.
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headquarters, designated zones of operation, the ability to procure, transport and
distribute arms’,42 the erection of checkpoints43 the issuing of public communique´s
and use of spokespeople.44 The need for a ‘command structure’ has been asserted45
and interpreted widely to mean that a group is able to speak ‘with one voice’46 and
‘formulate […] military tactics’.47 In the Bosˇkoski judgment, the ICTY held that
‘the degree of organization required to engage in ‘‘protracted violence’’ is lower
than that required to carry out ‘‘sustained and concerted military operations’’’.48
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) held the
organization requirement to be satisfied by a group’s ability to carefully plan,
coordinate and execute a military operation.49 Thus the jurisprudence paints a
picture in which organization need not match that of national armed forces. In
subsequent sections, these indicative criteria will be applied to the hostilities in
which US drone strikes have occurred.
In terms of the geographic application of IHL within NIAC, in the Tadic´ case it
was held that, during NIAC, IHL applies to ‘the whole territory under the control of
a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there’,50 though ‘some of the
provisions are clearly bound up with the hostilities and the geographical scope of
those provisions should be so limited’.51 Therefore IHL will apply to drone strikes
against a NSA carried out anywhere in a State where there is a NIAC involving that
NSA, even if far from active battlefields, where there is a nexus between that strike
and the NIAC.52
2.2 Internationalized NIACs
Though seemingly paradoxical, the possibility of an ‘internationalized’ NIAC is
important in this analysis as all US drone strikes have been extraterritorial, rather
than internal. While this article is not the place to continue the debate over
internationalized NIACs, a brief overview is necessary.
Key is the wording of common Article 2, defining IAC as being ‘between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties’. The fundament of IACs is their international
nature—they occur between States, recalling the original term ‘international’
posited by Jeremy Bentham, meaning ‘the mutual transactions between sover-
eigns’.53 However, the presence of multiple States will not necessarily transform a
42 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 90.
43 Ibid., para. 145; Haradinaj, above n. 31, paras. 71-72.
44 Limaj, above n. 22, paras. 101–103.
45 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, paras. 23-24; Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 65.
46 Ibid; Limaj, above n. 22, para. 129.
47 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 129.
48 Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 197.
49 Abella, above n. 30, paras. 147 and 155.
50 Tadic´, above n. 23, para. 70.
51 Ibid, para. 68.
52 Murray (2017), p. 87.
53 Bentham (2000), p. 236.
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NIAC into an IAC, as affirmed in jurisprudence54 and scholarship,55 the conflict
must be between those States. Considering briefly some permutations of these so-
called internationalized conflicts, it becomes clear how, in many instances, NIACs
can remain non-international.
When a NIAC spills-over into a third State it continues not to be between
States and so remains a NIAC despite its new cross-border geography.56
Likewise, if a third State intervenes in a NIAC at the invitation of a territorial
State government, the fighting remains between States and NSA, thereby
continuing to be non-international.57 Of course, if third States intervene on
behalf of a NSA against another State, the NIAC will become an IAC as it
opposes one State against others.58 The most controversial iteration of
internationalized NIAC is that of a State engaging in a conflict with a NSA
within the territory of another State where there is no pre-existing conflict.
Despite calls for international law to recognize a new type of conflict,59 the lex
lata is that, where intervention occurs with the consent of the territorial
government, by not opposing two States the conflict remains a NIAC, a finding
with much support.60 Where intervention is done without consent, a separate
IAC may arise between the intervening and host States, contemporaneous with
the NIAC between intervening State and NSA,61 though if fighting between
State and NSA becomes ‘inextricably bound up’ with that between States, both
conflicts may be part of a single IAC, for purposes of identifying which corpus
of IHL is applicable.62 It is therefore submitted that IACs are only ever those
that pit State against State, with all others being NIACs.
54 It is implicit in the dictum of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, asserting the
possibility of an armed conflict that is ‘international in character alongside an internal armed conflict’:
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 219; likewise that of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic´,
IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (15 July 1999), para. 84.
55 Dinstein (2011), p. 6; Dinstein (2014), p. 86; Dinstein (2010), p. 27; Sivakumaran (2012), p. 222; Kreß
(2010), p. 255; Pejic´ (2007), p. 91; Lubell (2012), p. 435; Lubell and Derejko (2013), pp. 67–68; Moir
(2001), p. 51.
56 ICRC Report on the 31st International Conference ‘International Humanitarian Law and the
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’ (Geneva, 2011) 31IC/11/5.1.2, p. 9; Sivakumaran (2012),
p. 230.
57 ICRC, above n. 56, p. 10; Akande (2012), p. 62; The Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08,
Decision on Confirmation of Charges (15 June 2009), paras. 245–246.
58 Schmitt (2014), p. 10; Akande (2012), p. 57; Dinstein (2014), p. 27; Pejic´ (2007), p. 90; Sivakumaran
(2012), p. 224; Moir (2002), pp. 50–51.
59 See, for instance, Lietzau (2002), pp. 78–80; Sho¨ndorf (2004); Corn (2007).
60 Lubell and Derejko (2013), pp. 67–68; Lubell (2012), p. 435; Sasso`li (2004); Sivakumaran (2012),
p. 229; Bassiouni (2003), p. 99; Jinks (2003b), pp. 40–41; Jinks (2005), p. 189; ICRC, above n. 56, p. 10.
61 Nicaragua and Tadic´, above n. 54.
62 Akande (2012), p. 73.
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3 Drone strikes and Armed Conflicts in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia
Now that the parameters of NIAC have been sketched they can be applied to the
factual situations ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ in which drone strikes have
been used by the US. This will enable the assessment of whether these situations
were or were not instances of NIAC and therefore whether the US was mistaken in
presumptively applying IHL. This section will consider first the notion that these
drone strikes are part of a global NIAC, before moving on to consider individually
the situations in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, to assess whether there are discrete
NIACs occurring in those regions.
3.1 The Purported Global NIAC
It has been suggested by officials that the US is in a global armed conflict against
multiple NSAs: the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) labelled the war on
terror ‘a global enterprise of uncertain duration’.63 Similarly, the 2003 National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism used rhetoric connoting a worldwide remit,
referring to the US’ ‘global reach’,64 the ‘multinational’ nature of groups like al-
Qaeda65 and the policy of the US to ‘focus decisive military power […] to defeat
terrorist networks globally’.66 The 2010 NSS referred to the ‘global campaign
against al-Qa’ida and its terrorist affiliates’67 while the 2015 NSS identified
‘globally connected’ groups.68 Harold Koh, then legal advisor to the US State
Department in 2010, claimed that ‘as a matter of international law, the United States
is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated
forces’,69 a view repeated by President Obama in 2013.70
The notion of a global armed conflict does not correlate with existing legal
categories to which IHL applies. It is nevertheless possible that the US is in a
single internationalized NIAC against a homogeneous NSA present in Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia, which would bring its drone programmes within the scope
of IHL. Indeed, it has been argued that ‘armed Islamist extremists remain the
enemy that carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks, and they remain the
belligerents in the ongoing War on Terror’.71 For a group to be a single non-
State party to a NIAC, each geographically separate entity must fit within the
overall organization of a single NSA, thereby satisfying the organization
63 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), preamble.
64 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), p. 2.
65 Ibid., p. 7.
66 Ibid., p. 17.
67 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2010), p. 19.
68 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2015), p. 9.
69 Koh, above n. 11.
70 Obama, ‘Remarks by the President at the National Defense University’ (23 May 2013), The White
House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-
defense-university.
71 Walsh (2015), p. 352 (emphasis added).
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threshold.72 This necessitates, at least, that the group possesses a command
structure73 and speaks ‘with one voice’.74 Arguably, the organization require-
ment becomes harder to satisfy when a (purported) group straddles international
borders. For instance, the ICTY has identified ‘the ability to procure, transport
and distribute arms’75 as indicative of organization, a significantly harder task
when done across borders.
The oft-identified NSA party to the purported global conflict is ‘al-Qaeda, […] the
Taliban and associated forces’.76 That these forces are ‘associated’ immediately
implies the opposite of a unified NSA with one voice, as to be ‘associated’ necessarily
requires separateness. The US defines an ‘associated force’ as ‘(1) an organized,
armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) a co-belligerent
with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners’.77 It has
been argued that the term ‘associated forces’ provides the US with scope to use force
against ‘regional extremist Islamist groups waging an armed conflict against the
United States [that] often do not conduct joint operations with al Qaeda’78 but this
appears only to be in terms of US domestic law.79 The implication that regional
NSAs, unaffiliated with al-Qaeda, will automatically be part of the NIAC between al-
Qaeda and the US is manifestly incorrect under the NIAC organization threshold.
The first category—NSAs having ‘entered the fight alongside al Qaeda’—is
prima facie below the organization threshold as it clearly envisages separate groups
fighting together, rather than one organizationally unified group. The need for NSAs
to speak with one voice80 within a single command structure81 requires more than
the ideological identification of one group with another. The word ‘alongside’, in
the US definition, like ‘associated’, implies organizational separation. The second
category, ‘co-belligerency’, has been reasserted by the US as a basis upon which to
include multiple groups within one NIAC.82 Its invocation is problematic because it
is a concept that historically applies to IACs and requires the participation in
hostilities to a significant extent.83 Its use within NIAC appears to be a conflation of
72 See above, Sect. 2.1.
73 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, paras. 23–24; Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 65.
74 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 60; Limaj, above n. 22, para. 129.
75 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 90.
76 Koh, above n. 11.
77 Johnson, ‘National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration’ (Speech at
Yale Law School 22 February 2012), http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/jeh-johnsons-speech-
national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448.
78 Walsh (2015), p. 355.
79 Walsh discusses the implicit inclusion of ‘associated forces’ within the Authorization of the Use of
Military Force by virtue of Sect. 1021(b) (the ‘Affirmation of Authority’), National Defense
Authorization Act 2011, both pieces of domestic US legislation. Walsh (2015), p. 354.
80 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 60; Limaj, above n. 22, para. 129.
81 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, paras. 23-24; Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 65.
82 Preston, ‘Prepared Statement on the Framework Under US Law for Current Military Operations’ (21
May 2014) before the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 1.
83 Co-belligerency can also occur through more formalized alliances. Oppenheim (1952), pp. 203 and
206.
M. Brookman-Byrne
123
the laws of IAC and NIAC. The notion that one NSA can be a co-belligerent purely
by virtue of engaging in violent acts against the same State as another NSA is
contrary to the NIAC organization requirement as it bypasses the need for unity of
command structure. Therefore, it is submitted that two NSAs cannot be viewed as a
single entity in this manner.
Ryan Vogel has asserted that al-Qaeda, conceived of as a global entity, satisfies
the organization requirement as it: ‘maintains ‘‘headquarters’’ in Pakistan and
Yemen from which it coordinates attacks’; ‘operates within designated Zones in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere’; and ‘has demonstrated a persistent
ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms to countries across the globe’.84
Vogel’s conclusions are based on a 2012 Report by the US Department of State85
and accords with the position of that administration. It is submitted that this view
fails to fully reflect the reality of the nature and degree of co-ordination between
disparate al-Qaeda franchises: an examination of the facts demonstrates that there
cannot be a single NIAC between the US and one homogeneous NSA,
encompassing Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The US has undertaken drone strikes
in Pakistan against members of al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the
Haqqani Network.86 In Yemen, drone strikes have targeted al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP),87 while in Somalia they have targeted al-Shabaab.88 Though
these groups share a broad ideology, that alone is insufficient to demonstrate unified
organization89—they are distinct groups operating in different States. In Pakistan,
al-Qaeda and TTP appear sufficiently integrated as they purportedly train and plan
attacks together,90 which accords with the jurisprudential understanding of
organization as including the formulation of military tactics91 sufficient for
‘protracted violence’.92 However, this group does not include those that operate in
other States. Al-Qaeda internationally comprises autonomous cells that lack central
organization.93 AQAP in Yemen has been described as ‘the most active operational
franchise’ of al-Qaeda94 but operating as a mere ‘terrorism franchise’ is below the
84 Vogel (2015).
85 US Department of State, Country Reports of Terrorism 2012: Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209989.htm.
86 Ackerman, ‘41 Men Targeted but 1,147 People Killed: US Drone Strikes—the Facts on the Ground’,
Guardian (London 24 November 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-
strikes-kill-1147.
87 Ibid.
88 Starr, ‘US Increasing the Pressure on Al-Shabaab in Somalia’, CNN (25 July 2015), http://edition.cnn.
com/2015/07/24/politics/al-shabaab-u-s-strikes/.
89 Schmitt (2012b), p. 130; Pejic´ (2014), pp. 83–84; Heller (2013), p. 110.
90 Brennan, interview transcript Washington Post (Washington DC 9 May 2010), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050901442.html.
91 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 129.
92 Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 197.
93 Zalman, ‘Al Qaeda—Profile of Al Qaeda’, About News (24 November 2014), http://terrorism.about.
com/od/groupsleader1/p/AlQaeda.htm.
94 ‘Profile: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’, Al Jazeera (London 9 May 2012), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2012/05/2012597359456359.html.
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requisite level of organization to view multiple groups as homogeneous.95 Likewise,
despite having strong links to al-Qaeda,96 al-Shabaab in Somalia is an
autochthonous group with its own command identity.
In 2014 Stephen Preston, then General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, specifically identified AQAP as ‘part of, or at least an associated
force’ of al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab as ‘openly affiliated’ with the group.97 But
this in itself does not satisfy the organization requirement as there is no unity
of command. Additionally, Preston’s assertion demonstrates that the determi-
nation as to whether a group is an ‘associated force’ is one made by the US98
contrary to the manner of determining armed conflict under international law
which requires objective assessment,99 mirroring the trend since 1949 away
from a legal threshold of war in favour of a factual threshold of armed
conflict.100
Thus these distinct groups are not one single NSA for the purposes of the NIAC
organization requirement and so the US cannot be in a single multinational NIAC.
Therefore, IHL may not be presumed to apply on this basis. Nonetheless, the US
may be fighting a series of distinct NIACs in different States. The ICTY has
confirmed that the existence of NIACs can only be determined on a case-by-case
basis101 and, as such, the next sections will consider in turn the situations in which
drones have been deployed in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.
3.2 Pakistan
In Pakistan, US drone strikes have targeted members of al-Qaeda, TTP and the
Haqqani Network.102 There are three possible avenues to include these strikes
within a NIAC: they may be spill-over from the conflict in Afghanistan; they may be
part of a NIAC between the Pakistani government and a non-State party; or they
may be part of a NIAC between the US and a non-State party.
3.2.1 Spill-over from Afghanistan
It is inappropriate presently to conduct an analysis of the nature of US
hostilities in Afghanistan, though some discussion is necessary as a spill-over
conflict self-evidently requires an armed conflict elsewhere. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) identified an IAC occurring in
Afghanistan from October 2001 until the establishment of the transitional
95 Paulus and Vashakmadze (2009), p. 119; Kreß (2010), p. 261.
96 Loahoud, ‘The Merger of al-Shabaab and Qa’idat al-Jihad’ (Combating Terrorism Center, 16 February
2012), https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-merger-of-al-shabab-and-qaidat-al-jihad.
97 Preston, above n. 82, p. 3.
98 Ibid.
99 Abella, above n. 30, para. 153.
100 Greenwood (2006), pp. 91–92.
101 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 90.
102 Ackerman, above n. 86.
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government in June 2002.103 This understanding is accurate as the use of force
by the US-led coalition against the Taliban government of Afghanistan satisfies
the inter-State definition of IAC under common Article 2. Upon the
establishment of the transitional government, the conflict continued as three
distinct NIACs, between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and the US, the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the government of
Afghanistan respectively.104 US officials have reiterated that there continues
to be an armed conflict in Afghanistan.105
The fighting in Afghanistan appears to satisfy the intensity and organization
requirements of a NIAC. While duration is a less conclusive determinant of intensity
than magnitude, it is a factor,106 and the non-international fighting in Afghanistan has
lasted from June 2002 until the present, strongly suggesting satisfaction of the criterion.
In terms of casualty and fatality numbers the non-international part of the conflict
resulted in the deaths of 23,496 civilians by the end of 2014.107 In addition, it has been
estimated that at least 2853 Afghan National Army soldiers were killed between 2003
and 2013,108 2771 of which were between 2010 and 2013.109 Considering available data
covering the period up to 2014, deaths among Afghan civilians and armed forces is
increasing.110 Since the beginning of 2003 there have been 2320 US fatalities111
decreasing yearly after a peak in 2010.112 Though the US’ involvement in Afghanistan is
purportedly drawing to a close, it has increased its troop presence113 and the Obama
Administration has stated it will maintain a force of 5500 soldiers until at least 2017.114
103 Letter from the Clerk of the Committee to Philip Spoerri, Legal Adviser, International Committee of
the Red Cross and Reply (20 December 2002), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/
cmselect/cmintdev/84/84ap09.htm.
104 Hampson (2012), p. 256.
105 Preston, ‘The Legal Framework for the United States’ Use of Military Force since 9/11’ (Speech at
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 10 April 2015), http://www.defense.
gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606662; Columbia District Court, Al Warafi v. Obama, Civil
Action No. 09-CV-2368 (RCL), p. 1.
106 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 49.
107 Based on data compiled in: Crawford, ‘War-Related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan
and Pakistan 2001–2014’ (Costs of War Report, Brown University 22 May 2015), http://watson.brown.
edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/War%20Related%20Casualties%20Afghanistan%20and%
20Pakistan%202001-2014%20FIN.pdf, p. 2.
108 ‘2,853 ANA Troops Killed in Action Since 2003’, Afghanistan Times (Kabul undated), http://old.
afghanistantimes.af/news_details.php?id=9352.
109 Nordland, ‘War Deaths Top 13,000 in Afghan Security Forces’, New York Times (New York 3 March
2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/asia/afghan-cabinet-releases-data-on-deaths-of-security-
personnel.html?_r=0.
110 Based on data compiled in: Crawford, above n. 107.
111 Based on data from icasualties: http://icasualties.org/oef/.
112 Ibid.
113 Ackerman and Rasmussen, ‘US to Deploy Hundreds of Troops in Afghanistan to Thwart Taliban’,
Guardian (London 8 February 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/08/hundreds-us-
troops-deployed-afghanistan-taliban-helmand.
114 Roberts and others, ‘Barack Obama Delays Withdrawal of US Troops from Afghanistan’, Guardian
(London 15 October 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/15/obama-delay-withdrawal-us-
troops-afghanistan.
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Statistics on the number of Taliban and al-Qaeda fatalities are sparse, though one
estimate suggests that 4300 Taliban fighters may have been killed in 2014 alone.115 In
addition, all sides have mobilized armed forces, using military rather than law
enforcement weapons, satisfying further criteria for the existence of a NIAC. Taken
together, these data provide a compelling case in favour of satisfaction of the NIAC
intensity requirement.
In terms of the organization of the non-State party to the conflict, the Taliban in
Afghanistan appears to satisfy a number of indicative criteria. The group has generally
spoken with one voice under the leadership of Mullah Omar since 1996, until the
revelation of his death in 2015.116 In November 2015 the group split into two rival
factions, one lead by Mullah Mansour (successor to Mullah Omar) and a breakaway
group lead by Mullah Rasool117 though it appeared that Mansour’s group continued to
represent the principle party engaged in fighting. This is supported by that group’s
continued military effectiveness: in October 2015, Mansour’s Taliban took control of
the city of Kunduz118 for 15 days119 and mounted a similar attempt in the city of
Sangin.120 These actions demonstrate an ability to carefully plan, coordinate and
execute military operations, satisfying criteria set out in the La Tablada decision.121 In
addition, Mansour’s Taliban had engaged in negotiations with the central government in
Afghanistan,122 another indicator of the requisite level of organization.123 These factors
point to the continued organization of the Taliban that is sufficient to allow continued
military activities, therefore satisfying the second element of the Tadic´ NIAC test. It
remains to be seen whether this level of organization will continue after Mansour’s death
by drone strike in May 2016, though the swift and unanimous appointment of Mullah
Haibatullah Akhundzada as his successor suggests it will.124
Thus there is likely a continuing NIAC in Afghanistan, which may have
spilled-over into Pakistan, though this does not mean that all drone strikes in
Pakistan will come within that NIAC. Due to the organizational NIAC
115 Crawford, above n. 107, p. 9.
116 ‘Who are the Taliban?’, BBC (London 29 September 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-
asia-11451718.
117 ‘Afghan Taliban Splinter Group Names Mullah Rasool as Leader’, BBC (London 4 November 2016),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34719314.
118 Goldstein and Mashal, ‘Taliban Fighters Capture Kunduz City as Afghan Forces Retreat’, New York
Times (New York 28 September 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/world/asia/taliban-fighters-
enter-city-of-kunduz-in-northern-afghanistan.html.
119 Nordland, ‘Taliban End Takeover of Kunduz After 15 Days’, New York Times (New York 13 October
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/world/asia/taliban-afghanistan-kunduz.html.
120 ‘Afghan and Taliban Forces Trade Blows in Sangin Battle’, Al Jazeera (London 25 December 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/afghan-taliban-forces-trade-blows-sangin-battle-151225073420
126.html.
121 Abella, above n. 30, paras. 147 and 155.
122 Ilyas Khan, ‘Can a Historic Peace Deal be Secured with the Taliban?’, BBC (London 8 July 2015),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-33449809.
123 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 125; Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 60; Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 203.
124 Khan and Rothwell, ‘Who is Haibatullah Akhundzada, the New Taliban leader?’, Telegraph (London
25 May 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/25/afghan-taliban-say-haibatullah-akhundzada-
appointed-new-leader/.
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requirement, only members of the non-State party to, or individuals directly
participating in, the NIAC in Afghanistan may be targeted in Pakistan as part of
that same conflict. Many of those targeted by US drone strikes in Pakistan have
been members of NSAs not party to the NIAC in Afghanistan. A lack of clear
data on the identities of those killed limits the ability to say with certainty the
number of drone strikes linked to the Afghanistan conflict. However, from a list
of 314 militants killed by drones whose identities have been confirmed by The
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, only 12 were specifically acknowledged as
involved in planning and carrying out activities in Afghanistan, while 25 were
members of groups generally active in Afghanistan.125 Therefore this brings
only 18 out of 233 strikes126 within a NIAC and, though it is likely that the
number is actually higher, this demonstrates the limited scope of the NIAC in
Afghanistan to bring drone strikes in Pakistan within the remit of IHL. Therefore
it is necessary to consider other avenues through which drone strikes may be
viewed as part of a NIAC.
3.2.2 TTP, Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Government
One possibility is that a NIAC exists between the Pakistani government and a NSA,
into which the US has been invited. Fighting has been ongoing in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region, and so it is necessary to consider
whether this reaches the requisite thresholds of intensity and organization to be
deemed a NIAC.
Before the formation of TTP in 2007, Pakistani armed forces engaged in sporadic
‘half-hearted’ skirmishes against tribal militant groups in FATA.127 In August 2008
the government launched its first major offensive against TTP, carrying out weekly
attacks and deploying over 15,000 troops by 2009.128 In 2013 the Pakistani
government sought peace talks with the TTP129 but in June 2014 launched operation
Zarb-e-Azb in response to assaults by TTP including the beheading of 23
soldiers,130 a rocket and machine gun attack on Karachi airport131 and the killing of
an army general.132 Operation Zarb-e-Azb has involved airstrikes and the
125 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism Naming the Dead database, as of June 2016. These figures do
not cover all strikes carried out by the US in Pakistan, only those that the Bureau has identified the victims
of, as this makes clear their militant affiliation.
126 Ibid.
127 Blank and Farley (2011), p. 156.
128 Ibid., p. 167.
129 Golovnina, ‘Pakistan Says No to Military Action Against Taliban’, Reuters (London 17 December
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-taliban-idUSBRE9BG0TF20131217.
130 Gul and Kakakhel, ‘TTP Tries to Justify Ruthless Killing of 23 FC Soldiers’, Dawn (Karachi 18
February 2014), http://www.dawn.com/news/1087719.
131 ‘TTP Claims Attack on Karachi Airport’, Dawn (9 June 2014), http://www.dawn.com/news/1111397.
132 Masood, ‘Senior Pakistani General is Killed in Insurgent Attack’, New York Times (New York 15
September 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/16/world/asia/insurgent-attack-kills-senior-
pakistani-general.html.
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positioning of 30,000 troops in FATA133 and is ongoing134 as are actions by TTP,
which, in 2016 carried out 276 attacks, killing 640 people.135
The number of clashes and casualties in Pakistan support a conclusion that the
fighting is sufficiently intense.136 In the Limaj case, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY
identified a NIAC based on ‘sporadic acts of violence’ over the course of a year,137
ranging from an attack that resulted in 83 deaths to a 20 minute firefight with no
casualties,138 ‘great devastation to a limited number of buildings’139 and the use of
‘tanks and armoured vehicles, heavy artillery weapons, air defence systems,
[armoured personnel carriers], machine guns, and explosives, among other
weapons’.140 The Chamber asserted that these facts demonstrated intensity
sufficient for a NIAC.141 TTP has used military-grade weapons and the government
has responded by deploying the army rather than the police, both evidence of NIAC-
level intensity.142 Furthermore, the conflict has been of a significant duration,
lasting over eight years. These factors support the contention that the conflict is
‘protracted’.
In terms of organization, TTP and al-Qaeda train and plan attacks together.143
This suggests that both may come within the same command structure (sufficient to
plan and execute ‘protracted violence’144) and, therefore, in terms of the
classification of a NIAC, may be conceived of as a single NSA. Alternately, the
Pakistani government may be engaged in two NIACs, one against TTP and another
against al-Qaeda. The TTP/al-Qaeda amalgam has training bases and headquarters
in South and North Waziristan, where it controls extensive territory. In addition, it
has demonstrated an ability to obtain and distribute arms, possesses a command
structure capable of coordinating the protracted violence detailed above, and has
engaged in negotiations with the government, all indicate requisite organization.145
As such it appears that this combined group may be a single NSA satisfying the
NIAC organization requirement, though the lack of substantial evidence prevents a
definitive conclusion. Nonetheless, since the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in 2013,
133 Zahid, ‘The Successes and Failures of Pakistan’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb’, The Jamestown Foundation
Terrorism Monitor (10 July 2015), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=44144&cHash=d4281630e5ad104ab6fbc0bd5f3bbf9f#.VsIEyZOLSRs.
134 ‘US Defence Intelligence Chief Lauds Zarb-e-Azb, Karachi Operation’, Geo TV News (Karachi 11
February 2016), http://www.geo.tv/latest/101030-US-defence-intelligence-chief-lauds-Zarb-e-Azb-
Karachi-Operation.
135 Rana and Sial (2017), p. 14.
136 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 49.
137 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 135.
138 Ibid., para. 138.
139 Ibid., para. 136.
140 Ibid., para. 166.
141 Ibid., para. 169.
142 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 49; Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, paras. 177-178.
143 Brennan, above n. 90.
144 Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 197.
145 See above, nn. 41–49.
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the group has reportedly splintered into multiple groups that lack central
organization146 meaning that it may no longer satisfy the organization requirement,
despite continuing to carry out intense attacks in 2016.147 The Haqqani Network
historically has been closely involved with both but focuses its activities instead in
Afghanistan.148 Indeed, the group has been linked to the Pakistani government and
was only banned in 2015149 and so cannot be seen as part of a single group with
TTP and al-Qaeda in a NIAC in Pakistan.
Thus it seems that there has been a NIAC occurring within Pakistan from August
2008 until sometime in 2014, when the TTP and al-Qaeda may have become too
fragmented to satisfy the organization requirement. US drone strikes were invited by
the Pakistani government from at least 2007 until October 2013 when consent was
rescinded.150 This consent was given validly, by requisite officials of the legitimate
government and so satisfies the requirements of international law governing
intervention by invitation.151 Therefore of the 424 drone strikes carried out in
Pakistan, 361 occurred during the NIAC prior to consent being retracted.152
3.2.3 TTP, Al-Qaeda and the US
Lastly, US drone strikes may fall more comprehensively within a NIAC if the US is
engaged in its own NIAC against TTP and al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
Force used by the US in Pakistan (excluding that which is part of the spill-over
conflict from Afghanistan) has been predominantly carried out with drone strikes.
Between 2004 and 2007 there were 11 strikes, but this increased after 2008 to 128 in
2010, causing 1108 deaths. This has receded and in 2015 there were only 13.153
Blank and Farley have argued that these drone strikes inherently satisfy the intensity
requirement.154 However, for the existence of a NIAC both sides must have used
force: the Tadic´ NIAC definition specifically refers to protracted violence ‘between’
146 Boone, ‘Isis Ascent in Syria and Iraq Weakening Pakistani Taliban’, Guardian (London 22 October
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/22/pakistani-taliban-spokesman-isis-pledge.
147 Burke, ‘Bacha Khan University Attack: What is Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan?’, Guardian (London 20
January 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/20/bacha-khan-university-attack-what-is-
tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp.
148 ‘Haqqani Network’ (Mapping Militant Organizations, undated), https://web.stanford.edu/group/
mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363.
149 Zahra-Malik, ‘Pakistan Bans Haqqani Network After Security Talks with Kerry’, Reuters (London 16
January 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-militants-haqqani-idUSKBN0KP1DA20150
116.
150 Miller and Woodward, ‘Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of US, Pakistan Agreement on
Drones’, Washington Post (Washington DC 24 October 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/toppakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone-campaign-secret-documents-show/
2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html.
151 See further, Byrne (2016).
152 ‘CIA and US Military Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to Present’ (The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism), https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NAfjFonM-Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wgLZDSCP-BQaux
51w/edit#gid=1436874561 (data as of July 2016).
153 Ibid.
154 Blank and Farley (2011), p. 178.
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parties,155 implicating a need for violence from each side. The fact that the US has
resorted to military force, though indicative of the intense violence of a NIAC, is not
determinative.156 It is necessary, therefore, to consider the use of force by the non-
State party to the conflict.
In the case of a possible NIAC between the US and a TTP/al-Qaeda amalgam, the
intensity and organization requirements are deeply connected—sporadic acts of
violence carried out globally may be sufficiently intense when aggregated, if they
were undertaken by a single group satisfying the organization requirement.
Conversely, if the organization threshold is not met, acts of violence cannot be
considered cumulatively and are, therefore, less likely to reach the intensity
threshold.157 The ICTY’s reference to ‘the degree of organisation required to
engage in ‘‘protracted violence’’’158 further demonstrates this interrelatedness of the
thresholds. It has been argued that attacks by al-Qaeda globally can be understood
cumulatively as beyond ‘isolated or sporadic’ thereby satisfying the intensity
requirement.159 However, this view is unpersuasive as actions ostensibly carried out
by al-Qaeda in Indonesia, Spain, the US, the UK and elsewhere have in fact been
perpetrated by franchises. Disparate franchises cannot satisfy the organization
requirement and so their actions cannot be considered collectively when establish-
ing intensity.160 Therefore, in assessing whether the US is in a NIAC in Pakistan,
the violence carried out by the specific non-State party must be considered in
isolation.
The TTP/al-Qaeda amalgam has carried out very few attacks against the US: an
analysis of available news reports reveals that between 2002 and 2016 there were
three carried out by the group, resulting in nine deaths, three of which were
American.161 The intensity requirement distinguishes NIACs from ‘banditry,
unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities’162 and the actions
of the TTP/al-Qaeda against the US are an archetypal example of terrorism.
Although terrorism can produce an armed conflict163 the number and intensity of
those carried out against the US are insufficient to enable such a conclusion.
155 Tadic´, above n. 23, para. 70 (emphasis added); reiterated in Art. 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute.
156 Schaller (2015), p. 218.
157 Lubell (2012), p. 437.
158 Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 197.
159 Dalton (2006), p. 527.
160 Paulus and Vashakmadze (2009), p. 119.
161 These are the February 2010 suicide attack against a US armoured vehicle, killing three soldiers
(Perlez, ‘Soldier Deaths Draw Focus to US in Pakistan’, New York Times (New York 3 February 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/world/asia/04pstan.html?_r=0); the April 2010 attack on the US
consulate in Peshawar, which caused no US and six Pakistani deaths, as well as property damage (Khan
and Tavernise, ‘US Consulate in Pakistan Attacked by Militants’, New York Times (New York 5 April
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/asia/06pstan.html); and the August 2011 kidnapping
of a US aid worker in Lahore (Alexander, ‘American Aid Worker Warren Weinstein Kidnapped in
Pakistan’, Telegraph (London 13 August 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
pakistan/8699426/American-aid-worker-Warren-Weinstein-kidnapped-in-Pakistan.html).
162 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 26.
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A further possible argument is that a NIAC may exist because violence was
employed against a foreign State. In the La Tablada case the IACHR specified an
‘internal’ aspect to violence falling short of NIAC,164 raising the possibility that
the internationalized nature of TTP/al-Qaeda attacks might produce a NIAC.
However, the fact that violence is directed against a State other than the host does
not have any special quality that creates a NIAC. No such suggestion has been
made elsewhere in jurisprudence or commentary. The ICTY’s cleaving of NIACs
from ‘banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities’ in
the Milosˇevic´ case,165 though implying an internal element with the word
‘insurrections’, clearly, by the use of ‘or’, sees terrorism as a separate type of
violence, a type the tribunal did not class as necessarily internal. That, coupled
with the fact that NIACs themselves need not be internal in terms of their
protagonists or geographical scope, supports a conclusion that an international-
izing element does not transform the legal classification of violence. It is therefore
submitted that the violence between the US and TTP/al-Qaeda falls short of the
intensity characterizing a NIAC.
Based on the above considerations of possible NIACs in Pakistan, those US
drone strikes carried out as part of the conflict between the Pakistani government
and the TTP/al-Qaeda amalgam (during the period that the Pakistani government
consented to US intervention) and the conflict in Afghanistan between the US and
the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network can be considered to have occurred
within NIAC, and are therefore to be subject to IHL. At the time of writing, this
equates to 381 out of 423 drone strikes in Pakistan. The fact that a majority of
strikes have been part of NIAC belies the suggestion that they were carried out
‘outside areas of active hostilities’ and as such their lawfulness rests with IHL.
Conversely, a sizable minority where carried out outside NIAC and must therefore
satisfy the restrictive rules of IHRL to have been lawful.
3.3 Yemen
The situation in Yemen is similarly complex. Though there is no spill-over conflict,
US drone strikes could come under the remit of IHL either as part of a pre-existing
NIAC between the Yemeni government and AQAP or as part of a NIAC between
the US and AQAP directly. Despite the lack of effective control by the government
of Yemen over much of the country, its continued de jure control has allowed it
validly to consent, under international law, to US drone operations.166
3.3.1 Houthi Rebels and the Yemeni Government
When considering NIAC involving the government of Yemen it is necessary to
distinguish one possible conflict, with AQAP, from another, involving Houthi
rebels. The latter appears to have begun in 2004 with a series of intense clashes
164 Abella, above n. 30, para. 151.
165 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25 para. 26 (emphasis added).
166 Byrne (2016), pp. 112–115.
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between Houthi groups and government forces167 involving around 2000 troops and
causing up to 600 deaths.168 Sporadic fighting continued until 2014 at which point it
escalated and the Houthis captured much of Sana’a, the capital.169 A coalition of
States have intervened at the request of the Yemeni government,170 involving
airstrikes which continue at the time of writing.171 Constraints of space prevent a
detailed consideration of this conflict, but the use of air strikes, deployments of
troops, assertion by the Houthi rebels that they will abide by IHL172 and the
agreement of a (failed) ceasefire,173 suggest the violence is a NIAC. Regardless, the
US has targeted its drone strikes in Yemen only against AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia or
al-Qaeda, not Houthi groups.174 The Houthis are opposed to al-Qaeda,175 described
as their ‘strongest opponents’176 and the two groups cannot in any way be connected
in the sense of being a single party to a NIAC. Thus it is necessary to determine
whether a separate NIAC exists in Yemen, between AQAP and the government.
3.3.2 AQAP and the Yemeni Government
Yemen has been in a state of instability since before unification in 1990. This grew
more acute after the 2011 Arab Spring, with multiple insurgent groups acting
against the government. The existing literature has broadly focused on the more
obvious conflict between the government and the Houthi rebellion, rather than that
between the government and AQAP, and detailed analysis of that conflict appears
167 ‘Yemen Forces ‘‘Kill 46 Militants’’’, BBC (London 25 June 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
middle_east/3839709.stm; ‘Clashes ‘‘Leave 118 Dead’’ in Yemen’, BBC (London 3 July 2004), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3863463.stm.
168 Whitaker, ‘Yemeni Forces Kill Anti-US Cleric’, Guardian (London 11 September 2004), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/11/yemen.brianwhitaker.
169 ‘Yemen Profile—Timeline’, BBC (London 25 November 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-14704951.
170 Identical letters dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2015/
217.
171 ‘Yemen Conflict: Civilians Killed in Air Strikes’, Al Jazeera (London 27 February 2016), http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/civilians-reported-killed-yemen-air-strikes-160227145903661.html.
172 Letter from Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi to Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Watch, dated 29
Jumada II 1430 (23 June 2009).
173 Mortimer, ‘Yemen Crisis: Saudi Arabia Ends Formal Ceasefire With Houthi Rebels After More Than 30
Fighters Killed Over Weekend’, Independent (London 4 January 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/middle-east/yemen-crisis-saudi-arabia-ends-formal-ceasefire-with-houthi-rebels-after-40-
fighters-are-killed-over-a6795501.html.
174 Based on data from New America Foundation, available at http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/
yemen-analysis.html#page1. This data refers to three strikes in which the target was ‘unclear’ but it is
submitted that this is most likely to be a lack of clarity as to which of the three al-Qaeda affiliated groups
were targeted, rather than a suggestion that the group might have been the Houthi rebels.
175 ‘Yemen Crisis: Who is Fighting Whom?’, BBC (London 26 March 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-middle-east-29319423.
176 Kirkpatrick and Fahim, ‘Saudi Leaders Have High Hopes for Yemen Airstrikes, but Houthi Attacks
Continue’, New York Times (New York 2 April 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/world/
middleeast/yemen-al-qaeda-attack.html?_r=0.
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almost entirely absent. This is likely in part due to its overshadowing by the Houthi
NIAC, but also because the intensity of the AQAP conflict has only emerged in
recent years.
What academic discussion there has been is divided as to the nature of hostilities.
Ramsden stated in 2011 that ‘the combat in Yemen is not even close to being
sufficiently protracted or intense so as to amount to a localized NIAC’.177 Writing at
the very early stages of the fighting, this conclusion is unsurprising as there was
little evidence to enable a rigorous analysis. Similarly, in 2012, Breau and Aronsson
briefly discussed a possible separate NIAC involving AQAP, concluding that the
intensity and organization requirements were not satisfied.178 Conversely, in 2012,
the ICRC implicitly recognized a NIAC, calling for all sides to respect IHL.179
More recent scholarship contains greater agreement that there is in fact a NIAC
involving AQAP.180 Nonetheless, the in-depth doctrinal analysis required to make a
conclusive determination as to the classification of the conflict remains outstanding.
Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), the precursor to AQAP, had a semblance of
government support post-unification, and Islamic militants returning from jihad
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan were used by President Saleh as a
counterbalance to Marxist politicians of the newly absorbed People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen.181 AQY undertook a variety of terrorist attacks against foreign
targets, including the 2000 USS Cole bombing,182 but did not conduct systemic
attacks against the Yemeni government. After 9/11 the Saleh government changed
its policy towards AQY and actively pursued it183 though through domestic law
enforcement.184 Nonetheless, until 2009 AQY and then AQAP still primarily
targeted non-Yemeni objects,185 meaning there was no NIAC between them and the
government. The government launched an offensive against AQAP in 2009 in
response to an attempted attack on Saudi Arabia and the US186; this involved
cooperation with the US, though without the use of armed drones. In November
2009 AQAP action against the government began, with the killing of seven Yemen
security personnel.187 Despite this, the number of attacks by AQAP against the
government was minimal and sporadic and therefore did not satisfy the NIAC
intensity requirement.
177 Ramsden (2011), p. 390.
178 Breau and Aronsson (2012), p. 278.
179 ICRC Annual Report 2012, vol. I, p. 452.
180 Schaller (2015), p. 218; Fuller (2015), p. 35.
181 Terrill (2011), pp. 48–49.
182 Ibid., p. 50.
183 Ibid., p. 52.
184 Ibid., p. 55.
185 ‘Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’, BBC (London 16 June 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-middle-east-11483095.
186 Ibid.
187 ‘Timeline: Al Qaeda Activity in Yemen’, Reuters (London 6 January 2010), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-yemen-qaeda-timeline-idUSTRE6052XK20100106.
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The situation changed significantly in 2011, during the uprising against President
Saleh, becoming much more intense. In May and June 2011, AQAP captured multiple
towns in the south of the country, controlling the large provinces of Shabwa and
Abyan188 until June 2012, when the government retook them.189 Nasir al Wuhayshi,
then-head of AQAP, stated that ‘control of these areas during one year cost us 500
martyrs, 700 wounded, […] and nearly $20 million’.190 In the Limaj case 169 deaths
from incidents between February and May 1998 was sufficiently intense for a NIAC,191
the same death rate (41–43 per month) as the violence between AQAP and the
government in southern Yemen. Reportedly 300-700 AQAP fighters were involved in
capturing Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan.192 This is higher than the levels in the Limaj
case, which were generally in the low hundreds,193 though lower than those of the
Haradinaj case, in which some operations involved up to 2000 Serbian soldiers.194
The government responded to the AQAP offensive with shelling and
airstrikes,195 in what was described as an ‘intensive campaign’.196 In the Limaj
case, use of heavy weapons and mortars indicated a NIAC.197 In addition, the
Yemini government utilized the army, air force and navy to recapture Abyan.198
This further indicates the existence of a NIAC199 as does the fact that fighting
occurred in multiple regions.200 Combat during 2011 and 2012 led to ‘tens of
thousands of civilians fleeing their homes201; in the Limaj case, the displacement
of 15,000 people supported the classification of that violence as a NIAC.202
Finally, the fighting has drawn the attention of the UN Security Council, which
has been said to indicate the existence of a NIAC.203 In Resolution 2014, the
188 Roggio, ‘Osama Bin Laden’s Files: AQAP Emir Foreshadowed 2011 Takeover of Southern Yemen’,
The Long War Journal (2 March 2016), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/osama-bin-
laden-documents-aqap-emir-outlined-strengths-prior-to-2011-takeover-of-southern-yemen.php.
189 Mukhashaf, ‘Yemen Army Seizes Qaeda Bastion in Major Advance’, Reuters (London 15 June
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-violence-idUSBRE85E0AG20120615.
190 Letter of May 2012 from Nasir al Wuhayshi to Abdelmalek Droukdel, quoted in Roggio, above n.
188.
191 Limaj, above n. 22, paras. 135–170.
192 Raghavan, ‘Militants Linked to al-Qaeda Emboldened in Yemen’, Washington Post (Washington 13
June 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/militants-linked-to-al-qaeda-emboldened-in-yemen/
2011/06/12/AG88nISH_print.html.
193 Limaj, above n. 22, paras. 141, 142, 147 and 151.
194 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 91.
195 Raghavan, above n. 192.
196 Ibid.
197 Limaj, above n. 22 para. 136; Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 31.
198 Dawood, ‘Broadened Military Attacks Purge Abyan’, Yemen Times (Sana’a, Yemen 14 May 2012),
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1572/news/835/Broadened-military-attacks-to-purge-Abyan.htm.
199 Abella, above n. 30, para. 155.
200 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 29.
201 Raghavan, above n. 192.
202 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 167.
203 Tadic´, above n. 31, para. 567; Dyilo, above n. 31, para. 235; Delalic´, above n. 31, para. 190;
Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 49; Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 177.
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Security Council called for AQAP to be addressed ‘in accordance with […]
international law including applicable human rights, refugee and humanitarian
law’204 suggesting implicit recognition of a NIAC. In the Bosˇkoski case, the
ICTY held that such language in Resolution 1345, reminding parties of their
obligations under IHL, suggested the Security Council viewed that situation as a
NIAC.205
It is submitted therefore that the conflict between the Yemeni government and
AQAP reached the level of intensity necessary for classification as a NIAC during
the period of 2011–2012. However, US drone strikes have continued since that
time so it is necessary to consider whether the combat has remained sufficiently
intense.
2013 was far less intense but still involved large-scale violence. AQAP
carried out attacks against Yemeni Security forces in August (killing five206),
twice in September (killing 31207 and 3208) and in December (killing 52209). A
similar level of attacks continued through 2014 resulting in the deaths of
approximately 48 Yemeni soldiers.210 During 2014 Yemeni armed forces began
a new offensive against areas which remained controlled by AQAP after the
2011–2012 struggle over the provinces of Shabwa and Abyan.211 Nonetheless,
it does not appear that this new offensive manifested in particularly intense
fighting. This seems to have continued until March 2015, at which point AQAP
captured the city of al-Houtha in Southern Yemen, involving ‘heavy clashes’ in
which 27 soldiers were killed.212 Later in 2015 AQAP captured districts within
the city of Aden, destroying government buildings and purportedly recruiting
‘hundreds of young men’.213 It was also reported to control many parts of
204 UNSC Res. 2014 (21 October 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/2014, para. 9 (emphasis added).
205 Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 192.
206 ‘‘‘Al-Qaeda Attackers’’ Shoot Dead Five Yemeni Soldiers Before Fleeing’, Al Arabiya (Dubai 11
August 2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/08/11/-Al-Qaeda-attack-kills-five-
Yemeni-soldiers-at-gas-terminal.html.
207 Mukhashaf, ‘Suspected al Qaeda Attacks on Yemeni Forces Kill at Least 31’, Reuters (London 20
September 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-attack-idUSBRE98J04V20130920.
208 ‘Suspected al-Qaeda Militants Storm Yemeni Army Base’, BBC (London 30 September 2013), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24335568.
209 ‘Al-Qaeda Claims Attack on Yemen Defence Ministry’, BBC (London 6 December 2013), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25256368.
210 ‘Militants Kill 10 Soldiers in Central Yemen’, Arab American News (Michigan 17 January 2014),
http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/news/id_8133; ‘Yemen Attack on Military Checkpoint ‘‘Kills
20 Soldiers’’’, BBC (London 24 March 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26712897;
Al-Haidari, ‘30 Dead as Yemen Army Launches New Assault on Qaeda’, Lebanon Daily Star (Beirut 29
April 2014), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Apr-29/254829-30-dead-as-yemen-
army-launches-new-assault-on-qaeda.ashx#axzz30LUUnOrr/.
211 Al-Haidari, above n. 210.
212 ‘Al-Qaeda Takes Control of Yemen’s Southern City of al-Houtha’, Al Arabiya (Dubai 20 March
2015), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/03/20/Al-Qaeda-takes-control-of-Yemen-s-
southern-city-of-al-Houta.html.
213 ‘Yemen Officials Say Al-Qaida Seizes Key Areas of Aden’, Daily Mail (London 22 August 2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3207059/Yemen-officials-say-al-Qaida-seizes-key-areas-
Aden.html.
Drone Use ‘Outside Areas of Active Hostilities’
123
Hadramout province, including its capital, Mukalla.214 In 2016 AQAP captured
the city of Aden, in which President Hadi is based, before it was retaken by
the government after two days.215 Additionally, in 2016 the Saudi-led coalition
supporting the Yemeni government against the Houthi rebels began airstrikes
against AQAP.216
It is arguable that fighting between the Yemeni government and AQAP may have
ceased to be sufficiently intense during the period of 2013 to March 2015. In order to
assess the impact of this upon the legal paradigm governing uses of force, we must
first consider the point at which a NIAC ceases. There has been very little written on
this topic: common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II say nothing, and key
monographs discuss it briefly,217 or not at all.218 The ICTY has suggested a NIAC
lasts ‘beyond the cessation of hostilities until a peaceful settlement is achieved’,219
meaning that, regardless that fighting may diminish in intensity below the threshold
for the start of a NIAC, the conflict continues, until a ‘peaceful settlement’ manifests.
This has been supported in the Haradinaj case, in which the Tribunal stated that
Since according to the Tadic´ test an internal armed conflict continues until a
peaceful settlement is achieved, and since there is no evidence of such a
settlement during the indictment period, there is no need for the Trial Chamber
to explore the oscillating intensity of the armed conflict in the remainder of the
indictment period.220
This approach bases the end of a NIAC on the words of the parties, rather than
the factual situation. Thus, it is contrary to the tenor of the Geneva Conventions
which emphasize facts rather than statements in establishing the start of an armed
conflict,221 reflecting sentiment expressed at the 1949 diplomatic conference that
‘the Parties to a conflict could not be sole judges as to whether a state of war
existed’.222 It is perhaps because of this distinction that text writers appear en masse
214 Aboudi, ‘Islamists Rise as Chaos Descends in Yemen’s Cosmopolitan Port’, Reuters (London 27
October 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-aden-insight-idUSKCN0SL0S3201510
27.
215 ‘Yemen Declares Curfew in Aden as Government Forces Retake Strategic Port’, Guardian (London 4
January 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/04/yemen-declares-curfew-in-aden-as-
government-forces-retake-strategic-port.
216 ‘Yemen (Houthis/AQAP/SMM)’ (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict
Database, undated), https://acd.iiss.org/en/conflicts/yemen–houthis-aqap-smm-9651?as=5CCB6A81596
A491F8F42886AED782B28.
217 Sivakumaran (2012), p. 252–254; Dinstein (2014), pp. 48–50.
218 Moir (2002); Cullen (2010).
219 Tadic´, above n. 23, para. 70 (emphasis added).
220 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 100.
221 Though common Art. 2 applies in ‘all cases of declared war’ (emphasis added), it also covers ‘any
other armed conflict which may arise’, thus removing the important role declarations previously played.
In terms of NIACs, common Art. 3 does not require a declaration and the Tadic´ definition considers only
the factual interaction of parties to a conflict.
222 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva (1949) IIB, 10 (UK). It was also asserted that
‘even if war was not recognized, the rules concerning the conduct of war should be applied’, ibid., 11
(Norway).
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to have adopted a different stance. Sivakumaran has stated that ‘the applicability of
the law of [NIAC] turns on whether or not a [NIAC] continues to exist at the
relevant time’.223 This means ‘the lack of a peace agreement cannot be considered
determinative’ and that a NIAC may persist after a ceasefire has been agreed ‘as
violence of requisite intensity may continue to exist’.224 Dinstein has seemingly
agreed, stating that a NIAC will end when ‘insurgents are roundly beaten’,225 and
that less intense violence may continue after the legal end of a NIAC.226 Bartels has
undertaken a more extensive analysis, concluding that once the threshold
requirements are no longer satisfied, a NIAC will cease,227 though he maintains
that, rather than stating the law, he is testing a hypothesis.228 Going further,
Milanovic´ has described this approach as a ‘general principle’, identifying the
disapplication of IHL ‘once the conditions that trigger its application in the first
place no longer exist’.229 Clearly contrary to the approach of the ICTY, Milanovic´
consciously posits his formulation as ‘[a]nother option’, that is ‘more logical from a
purely IHL standpoint’.230 Nonetheless, in describing its application, he uses the
conditional tense (‘the only legally relevant question would be whether the threshold
continues to be satisfied’231) suggesting that, desirable as this principle may be, its
existence cannot be confirmed. Jinks asserts a similar ‘general rule’ based on Article
6 of the fourth Geneva Convention, which proclaims the application of IHL until
‘the general close of hostilities’.232
Clearly the law is unsettled and open to interpretation. One may adopt a broad
interpretation that a NIAC will continue until agreement is reached or the NSA
party no longer exists, thereby prolonging the application of IHL and the modified
IHRL protections of those subject to it. The alternative is a restrictive interpretation
that a NIAC ends when hostilities fall below the intensity threshold, limiting the
temporal scope of IHL. Regardless, the choice of interpretation has important
implications for the analysis of US drone strikes in Yemen (and Somalia) as the
fighting has occurred over long periods with oscillating intensity, likely falling
below the Tadic´ threshold, before satisfying it again subsequently.
As stated above, ‘terrorist activities’ are distinct from NIACs when they do not
satisfy the Tadic´ test.233 There is no clear State practice to suggest when terrorist
activities are intense enough to become a NIAC, though ICTY jurisprudence is
informative. Considering the facts presented above, it seems likely that fighting
between AQAP and the Yemeni government fell below the intensity threshold
223 Sivakumaran (2012), p. 253.
224 Ibid., p. 253.
225 Dinstein (2014), p. 48.
226 Ibid., p. 50.
227 Bartels (2014), p. 311.
228 Ibid., p. 314.
229 Milanovic´ (2014), p. 170 (emphasis added).
230 Ibid., p. 180.
231 Ibid. (emphasis added).
232 Jinks (2003a).
233 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 26.
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between 2013 and March 2015: there are gaps of many months between attacks
(there were 7 reported in 27 months) and the number of those killed is significantly
less (an average of approximately 5 per month during the period).234 Nonetheless, it
has been suggested elsewhere that six attacks, globally, over a period of six years is
sufficiently intense.235 This suggestion was made in support of the notion that the
global acts of al-Qaeda were part of a single NIAC, a notion that has—within this
work—been argued to be incorrect under international law.236 Even if the
underlying assertion as to intensity is correct in terms of the time-frame of attacks
(one per year),237 the six attacks referred to238 produced a combined death-toll of
3525 (an average of 49 per month) ten times that of the relevant period in Yemen,
suggesting those in Yemen would still remain far below the intensity threshold.
In the period from March 2015 until the present, the fighting may have crossed the
intensity threshold again, though less overtly than in 2011–2012. While the death-toll
remains comparatively low, more territory has been captured, government buildings
have been destroyed and the response has been military; all indicative of requisite
intensity.239 Further, the Security Council condemned the actions of AQAP, referring
to the fighting in terms of IHL,240 though it subsequently appeared to describe it as
terrorism, with no reference to IHL.241 Therefore, the violence in Yemen arguably
intensified enough during this period to satisfy the intensity threshold.
It is now necessary to look at the organization of AQAP. The primary
requirements—of a ‘command structure’,242 and the ability to speak ‘with one
voice’243—appear satisfied: AQAP was founded with a hierarchy containing defined
roles, including leader, deputy leader, military commander244 and field comman-
der.245 Upon the death of original leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi in 2015, a new leader,
Qassim al-Raimi, took over straightaway.246 The group has a bimonthly magazine,
Sada al-Malahim,247 an indication of it having a single, organized voice. The ICTY
234 See above, nn. 206–214.
235 Dalton (2006), p. 527.
236 See above, n. 160.
237 This is purely work of the devil’s advocate; the present author submits that, even if attributable to a
single NSA, six attacks over six years are manifestly isolated and sporadic and below the intensity
threshold.
238 The al-Qaeda bombings in New York, Madrid, Bali, London and Amman; Dalton (2006), p. 527.
239 See above, nn. 31–39.
240 UNSC Res. 2201 (15 February 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2201.
241 UNSC Res. 2216 (14 April 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2216.
242 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, paras. 23–24; Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 65.
243 Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 60; Limaj, above n. 22, para. 129.
244 ‘Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, Counterterrorism Guide (United States National
Counterterrorism Center, undated), http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html.
245 Haddad (2014), p. 22.
246 Mazzetti and Shane, ‘For US, Killing Terrorists is a Means to an Elusive End’, New York Times (New
York 16 June 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-
yemen-nasser-al-wuhayshi-killed.html?ref=middleeast&_r=0.
247 ‘Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2015), http://
www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.
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has emphasized the ability to ‘formulate […] military tactics’248 which appears
satisfied by the military successes of AQAP in capturing various Yemeni cities.
Several other indicators of organization proposed by the ICTY also appear satisfied
by AQAP: Sada al-Malahim arguably represents the issuing of communique´s249 as
does AQAP’s release of public statements.250 It has erected checkpoints in occupied
regions,251 another indicative factor.252 Finally, AQAP has engaged in negotiations
and mediations with the Yemeni government,253 further indicating that the group
surpasses the organization threshold.254
As a result of the above analysis, a nuanced conclusion as to the ongoing NIAC
in Yemen can be made. It is submitted that a NIAC existed in Yemen between the
government and AQAP beginning in May 2011, lasting until June 2012. Based on
available data, and in light of the Yemeni government’s purported consent to US
drone strikes,255 this would mean at least 64 US drone strikes in Yemen fall within
the scope of IHL.256 It also means that one strike was certainly outside the scope of
IHL as it happened in 2002.257 After June 2012 there is less clarity, both in terms of
facts and law. If a restrictive interpretation of the end of NIACs is adopted then it
seems that until March 2015 there was likely no NIAC, or at least there is no way of
concluding unequivocally that there was one. In this scenario 85 drone strikes most
likely occurred outside the scope of IHL.258 However, if the broad interpretation of
the ICTY is adopted, the ongoing, less intense violence and absence of a peace
agreement will have sustained the NIAC, bringing those 85 strikes within the remit
of IHL. Finally, from March 2015 until the time of writing it seems more likely than
not that a NIAC existed under the restrictive interpretation and certain that one
existed under the broad one, therefore bringing a further 48 drone strikes into the
remit of IHL.259
248 Limaj, above n. 22, para. 129.
249 Ibid., paras. 101–103.
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(Sana’a, Yemen 24 December 2013), http://www.yementimes.com/en/1740/news/3270/AQAP-
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This conclusion means that either there have been 86 drone strikes in Yemen
carried out outside of the IHL framework, or just the individual one that occurred in
November 2002. In either case, it has been demonstrated that the existence of a
NIAC between AQAP and the Yemeni government and the latter’s consent to US
intervention does not bring the entirety of the US drone programme within the scope
of IHL.
3.3.3 AQAP and the US
Of course, all drone strikes will governed by IHL if the US was in its own NIAC
with AQAP, and this possibility will now be considered. It has already been
proposed that AQAP has the requisite organization, so that part of the analysis is
unnecessary. In addition, it was shown above that al-Qaeda cannot be understood to
be a globally organized group such that all terrorist acts carried out by regional
franchises in its name can be attributed to it.260 Therefore, in terms of intensity, we
must consider only those acts carried out against the US perpetrated by AQAP (or
its predecessor, AQY).
Farley has argued succinctly that violence between the US and AQAP is
insufficiently intense to be a NIAC,261 as has Heller,262 and it is submitted that these
arguments are correct: however, further analysis will help reinforce this conclusion.
Attacks upon the US by AQAP do not appear to satisfy the intensity requirement of
a NIAC, when considered through the lens of the indicative factors that have
informed the ICTY. There are three attacks or attempted attacks, targeted against
the US, that appear unquestionably attributable to AQAP or AQY: the attack by
suicide-boat bomb on the USS Cole in October 2000, in which 17 sailors were
killed263; the failed December 2009 bombing of a flight to Detroit264; and the failed
October 2010 bombing of US-bound cargo planes.265 In addition, it has been
claimed that AQAP ‘radicalized’ those responsible for the 2009 shooting at Fort
Hood, Texas and the 2010 attempted bombing of Times Square.266 It is submitted
that the ‘radicalization’ of an individual provides an insufficient connection to the
NSA under the organization threshold for their actions to be considered within an
analysis of intensity, in the manner mandated in the Bosˇkoski judgment.267
Radicalized individuals like these are not under the auspices of a NSA’s command
structure for purposes of planning armed engagements. Finally, Terrill has
260 Paulus and Vashakmadze (2009), p. 119.
261 Farley (2011), p. 70.
262 Heller and Dehn (2011), p. 183.
263 Whitaker, ‘Death for USS Cole Bombing’, Guardian (London 30 September 2004), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2004/sept/30/alqaida.terrorism.
264 ‘Al-Qaeda Wing Claims Christmas Day US Flight Bomb Plot’, BBC (London 28 December 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8433151.stm.
265 Mazzetti and Worth, ‘US Sees Complexity of Bombs as Link to Al Qaeda’, New York Times (New
York 30 October 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/world/31terror.html?pagewanted=all.
266 Profile: AQAP, above n. 169.
267 Bosˇkoski, above n. 31, para. 197.
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suggested that the attacks of 11 September 2001 against the US can be attributed to
AQAP; he claims a ‘subtle Yemeni link’ in that some of the hijackers were ‘Saudis
of Yemeni descent’,268 Osama Bin Laden’s fourth wife was Yemeni,269 and he (Bin
Laden) had funded some al-Qaeda activities in the country.270 It is submitted that
this is insufficient to satisfy the organization requirement of a NIAC that would be
necessary in order to include this attack within the present intensity analysis.
Simultaneously, of course, the US has carried out drone strikes against AQAP
which could be suggested to push the total violence over the NIAC intensity
threshold. It has been argued that the definition adopted by the ICTY in the Tadic´
case, in focusing on ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups’271 emphasizes the need for violence from at least two
parties.272 This understanding is implicit in common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, by its application to ‘each Party to the conflict’. Therefore, to pass the
threshold, intense violence must have occurred as a result of actions on both sides of
the conflict which, in this case, has not occurred, the only deaths being 17 US sailors
in a 16-year period.
As a result of this analysis, it is clear that there have been significant periods
amounting to NIAC, between the government of Yemen and AQAP, into which the
US has been invited to intervene. It is difficult to say with certainty how many
strikes fall within this NIAC due to the lack of clarity surrounding the end of NIAC.
As stated above, a restrictive interpretation of the end of NIAC means that 86 out of
198 strikes (and between 328 and 492 killed out of between 904 and 1308) occurred
outside of NIAC.273 Conversely, under a permissive interpretation all bar one strike
and six deaths occurred within NIAC. Nonetheless, despite the ambiguities of the
law producing two distinct figures, it remains clear that drone strikes have not been
pursued in a legal vacuum and that claims as to the applicable paradigm of
international law can be made. While the term ‘outside of active hostilities’ seems
to flatten out the contours of the fight against AQAP such that drone strikes in the
region are all presumptively governed by IHL, the reality is that there are strikes that
formed part of the NIAC and one or more that did not. Those in the latter category
cannot but be considered through the lens of IHRL obligations given their ordinary
meanings, without being interpreted through IHL.
3.4 Somalia
In Somalia, US drone strikes have been consented to by the government which, like
that of Yemen, has very weak effective control but maintains de jure authority over
the State, enabling it to give valid consent to third State uses of force.274 Drone
268 Terrill (2011), p. 51.
269 Ibid., p. 44.
270 Ibid., p. 48.
271 Tadic´, above n. 23, para. 70 (emphasis added).
272 Lubell and Derejko (2013), p. 78. See also above nn. 154–155.
273 TBIJ Yemen, above n. 256.
274 Byrne (2016), pp. 115–117.
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strikes have been carried out against al-Shabaab exclusively;275 beyond sharing an
ideology, al-Shabaab is not part of any NSA with which the US is engaged in a
NIAC elsewhere, so there is no question of strikes in Somalia being part of a spill-
over conflict. Thus, it is necessary, as with Pakistan and Yemen, to determine
whether there exists a NIAC between the Somali government and al-Shabaab or,
alternately, between the US and al-Shabaab. This question has been given
insufficient treatment previously; Alasow has asserted the applicability of common
Article 3 to the broader conflict in Somalia—not just that involving al-Shabaab—
but without a detailed consideration of intensity and organization.276 It is therefore
submitted that it cannot be viewed as conclusive of the issue, necessitating further
engagement, which will be carried out presently.
3.4.1 Al-Shabaab and the Somali Government
It is impossible to examine the existence of a NIAC between al-Shabaab and the
Somali government without first considering its recent historical context. After the
fall of the Barre regime in 1991, Somalia was without central government for
many years, hosting ongoing violence between rival militia and warlords.277 It is
beyond the remit of this work to consider whether that situation was a NIAC
though it has been described as a ‘civil war’.278 In 2004, the Islamic Courts Union
(ICU) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) emerged as two major
powers in Somalia, polarizing the conflict, the ICU, backed by Eritrea, and the
TFG, by Ethiopia.279 The violence appears to have the characteristics of a NIAC
as it involved automatic weapons, bombs, mines, mortars, grenade launchers and
antiaircraft guns,280 and resulted in hundreds of deaths and the displacement of
thousands of civilians.281 Additionally, negotiations between the two groups282
and the command framework of the ICU283 suggests the organization threshold
was satisfied. Between December 2006 and January 2007 the TFG defeated the
ICU, retaking territory the group had captured.284 The ICU returned to an
insurgency style conflict with the TFG, but in September 2007 senior ICU
members were key in forming the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
275 ‘Somalia: Reported US Covert Actions 2001–2016’ (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism), https://
www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/22/get-the-data-somalias-hidden-war/.
276 Alasow (2010), p. 133–134.
277 ‘Somalia: 2015 Country Review’ (Country Watch 2015), http://www.countrywatch.com/Content/
pdfs/reviews/B44Q9Q34.01c.pdf p. 8.
278 See, for instance, ‘Country Profile: Somalia’, Al Jazeera (London 9 September 2012), http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/08/201281985222499991.html; ‘Somalia Country Profile’, BBC (London
4 February 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503.
279 Shay (2014), p. 58.
280 Ibid., p. 58.
281 Ibid., p. 63.
282 Ibid., p. 39.
283 Ibid., pp. 45–53.
284 Harper (2012), p. 83.
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(ARS)285 which reached a peace agreement with the TFG in Djibouti in June
2008,286 thereby concluding the NIAC, even under the broad Tadic´ criteria for
cessation.287
Al-Shabaab germinated within the ICU but cannot be said to have carried on the
ICU’s NIAC with the TFG. It was at first ‘a relatively marginal insurgent group’288
and was ideologically distinct from the ICU.289 Thus it is necessary to consider the
conflict between al-Shabaab and the government in isolation when determining its
classification.
This determination is difficult due to a paucity of data, particularly during the early
stages of the conflict, but it is possible to build enough of a picture to make tentative
conclusions. It has been asserted that by November 2007, al-Shabaab carried out 55
percent of attacks against the government,290 though it is unclear what this actually
amounts to. The early period was characterized by ‘koormeer’ techniques, in which al-
Shabaab would capture government outposts or undefended cities for two or more
days, enforcing Sharia law, before departing.291 In August 2008, al-Shabaab captured
the city of Kismayo from the TFG, in a battle lasting three days which caused 100
deaths and displaced up to 25,000 civilians.292 Later in 2008 al-Shabaab captured
Merka, with ‘hundreds of heavily armed […] fighters’ and ‘trucks mounted with anti-
aircraft weapons’.293 Other occasions of al-Shabaab’s capture of cities involved the
mobilization of up to 1000 fighters.294 These instances suggest that, though labelled a
terrorist organization, the actions of al-Shabaab were more than mere ‘terrorist
activities’.295 Individual acts of violence lasted for long periods and occurred over a
number of years, covering a large geographical area and resulting in numerous
casualties. The governmental response involved the deployment of troops rather than
police, and, during the initial period of the violence, 7650 Africa Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) troops were deployed.296 As early as May 2008, the UN Security
Council referred to the situation in the language of IHL, indicating violence satisfying
the intensity threshold.297 As a result of this, it is submitted that, at some point during
285 Shay (2014), p. 76.
286 Agreement Between The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and The Alliance for the Re-
liberation of Somalia (9 June 2008), http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/
080818%20-%20Djibouti%20Agreement.pdf.
287 See above nn. 219–220.
288 Hansen (2013), p. 54.
289 Shay (2014), p. 99.
290 Hansen (2013), p. 58.
291 Ibid., p. 58.
292 ‘Somali Insurgents ‘‘Take Key Port’’’, BBC (London 22 August 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/africa/7576307.stm.
293 Adow, ‘Islamic Rebels Grab Key Somali Port’, CNN (12 November 2008), http://edition.cnn.com/
2008/WORLD/africa/11/12/somalia.towns.seized/.
294 Hansen (2013), p. 79.
295 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, para. 26.
296 African Union, Peace and Security Council Communique (19 January 2007), PSC/PR/Comm.(LXIX),
para. 9.
297 UNSC Res. 1814 (15 May 2008), UN Doc. S/RES/1814, para. 16.
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2007 and 2008, violence of NIAC intensity between the government and al-Shabaab
began.298
During the subsequent period al-Shabaab twice attempted to capture
Mogadishu, the capital city. In May 2009 the group (in collaboration with
another NSA, Hizb al-Islam) engaged in a protracted battle for the city, against
TFG and Ugandan troops,299 involving heavy weapons by both sides, including
mortars,300 tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs).301 The violence
resulted in the displacement of 60,000 civilians302 and up to 200 deaths.303 A
further offensive against the city, in August 2010 involved at least 1800 al-
Shabaab fighters and an opposing AMISOM force of infantry and tanks.304 These
examples suggest the fighting between al-Shabaab and the government remained
sufficiently intense throughout 2010.
Between August 2011 and the present, al-Shabaab has returned to insurgency
tactics, rather than engaging in large battles to capture towns, and the
government and AMISOM have recaptured many areas.305 The group has
continued to carry out suicide and bomb attacks, which have often resulted in
large numbers of fatalities.306 The argument could be made that these attacks are
now sporadic enough to be terrorist only, falling short of the intensity of a
NIAC. However, in responding to al-Shabaab, the AMISOM military force
currently comprises 22,126 troops, and its mission profile emphasizes its military
298 The lack of specificity as to the commencement of the NIAC is not problematic in the current context
as US drone strikes did not begin until 2011.
299 ‘At Least 35 Killed in Somali Clashes’, New York Times (New York 10 May 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/05/11/world/africa/11somalia.html.
300 ‘Nearly 40 Killed in Mogadishu, Mosque Hit’, Radio France Internationale (Paris 11 May 2009),
http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/113/article_3731.asp.
301 Hansen (2013), p. 81.
302 ‘Mogadishu Victims Swamp Hospitals’, BBC (London 27 May 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/africa/8070144.stm.
303 ‘Troops Reinforce Somalia Airport’, BBC (London 26 May 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/8068455.stm.
304 Hansen (2013), p. 101.
305 See, for instance, Khalif, ‘AMISON Troops Drive Shabaab Out of Suburbs’, Daily Nation (Nairobi 20
January 2012), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/Amisom?troops?drive?Shabaab?out?of?suburbs?
±/1066/1311036/-/v1f373z/-/index.html; ‘Somalia al-Shabab Militant Base of Baidoa Captured’, BBC
(London 22 February 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17127353; ‘Somalia Forces Capture
Key al-Shabab Town of Afmadow’, BBC (London 31 May 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
18288639; Ni Chonghaile, ‘Kenyan Troops Launch Beach Assault on Somali City of Kismayo’, Guardian
(London 28 September 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/28/kenyan-soldiers-capture-
kismayo-somalia.
306 Flood and Albadri, ‘Massive al-Shabaab Suicide Bomb Kills Over 80 in Somali Capital Mogadishu’,
Telegraph (London 4 October 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
somalia/8806699/Massive-al-Shabaab-suicide-bomb-kills-over-80-in-Somali-capital-Mogadishu.html;
Pflanz, ‘Al-Shabaab Suicide Bomber Dies in Attack on Somalia Presidency’, Telegraph (London 29
January 2013) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9834874/
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nature.307 Furthermore, al-Shabaab, which maintains an estimated force of
7000–9000 fighters,308 has responded to government actions to retake cities with
heavy fighting.309 These facts support a conclusion that ongoing violence is
sufficiently intense. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union
appears to have sought to change the emphasis of the AMISOM presence in
Somalia towards law enforcement,310 but this fact alone does not rebut the
evidence of ongoing intense violence. Furthermore, the UN Security Council
has, in recent resolutions dealing with security in Somalia, recognized the threat
posed by al-Shabaab and made reference to the applicability of IHL.311
In terms of organization, there is much to suggest that al-Shabaab is sufficiently
organized to satisfy the Tadic´ threshold. The group has been described as having a
‘functional structured organization’, led by an Amir and a ten-member shura majlis
(council) which makes decisions for the group.312 Beneath this there are other branches,
including a military branch, that are in turn sub-divided into different entities with
distinct functions.313 Locally, al-Shabaab’s administrative structure includes ‘a
governor (wali), Office of Social Affairs, Office of Finance, Office of the Judge and
Office of the Hesbah Army, the equivalent of a police force’.314 This suggests the
existence of a command structure indicating requisite organization.315 The group has
demonstrated an ability to transport troops and weapons throughout the country316 and
into it by sea,317 another indicator of organization.318 Finally, al-Shabaab is organized in
terms of communication with the public, to the point of having its own television
channel,319 a factor that has also been shown to indicate sufficient organization.320
307 AMISOM: Mission Profile: Military Component, http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-
component/.
308 ‘Who are Somalia’s al-Shabaab?’, BBC (London 3 April 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-15336689.
309 Mohamed, ‘Al-Shabaab ‘‘Retreats’’ in Battle for Town’, Al Jazeera (London 8 March 2014), http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/03/al-shabab-retreat-battle-town-201437145216588883.html; ‘AMI-
SOM and Somali Forces Liberate Barawe, Al-Shabab’s Biggest Stronghold’, Raxanreeb (Mogadishu 5
October 2014), http://www.raxanreeb.com/2014/10/somalia-breaking-news-amisom-and-somali-forces-
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315 Milosˇevic´, above n. 25, paras. 23-24; Haradinaj, above n. 31, para. 65.
316 Hansen (2013), p. 114.
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Based on this analysis it is submitted that al-Shabaab has the characteristics of a
sufficiently organized group, and that the violence between it and the government
meets the intensity threshold recognized within international law. Therefore, a NIAC
has existed in Somalia between these parties since 2007 or 2008 and is ongoing at
present. As the present author has asserted elsewhere,321 the US was invited to join
the NIAC by the Somali government in 2007, rendering it a party to the NIAC.
Nevertheless, at least since 2013 consent given has been specifically restricted to
drone strikes against non-Somali fighters.322 Prior to this, six drone strikes were
carried out that are, as such, quite likely within the NIAC. Out of 21 drone strikes
since 2013, there have been three that directly targeted fighters whose nationality was
certainly Somali.323 Therefore these strikes may be outside of the NIAC unless
specific consent was received. They will therefore likely only be subject to IHL if
there is a separate NIAC between the US and al-Shabaab. In three other cases,
airstrikes involving drones targeted large groups of fighters, in one instance reportedly
killing up to 200.324 Though foreign fighters feature in al-Shabaab, they in no way
comprise a majority of the group,325 therefore, in cases of drone strikes against large
groups, it would have been very difficult for the US to limit their targeting to non-
Somali fighters. Thus, it is probable, though not certain, that these strikes also fall
outside the scope of this NIAC, though again, specific consent may have been given.
Finally, there have been 15 strikes since 2013 in which it has been impossible to
confirm the nationality of those targeted,326 and as such no determination can be made
either way as to the inclusion or exclusion of the strikes within the NIAC. Therefore,
overall at least three, and possibly as many as 21, drone strikes cannot be included
within the NIAC between the Somali government and al-Shabaab.
3.4.2 Al-Shabaab and the US
The final aspect of this analysis will consider whether a NIAC exists (or existed)
between the US and al-Shabaab, thereby bringing a greater number of drone strikes
into the remit of IHL. It has already been shown that al-Shabaab easily satisfies the
organization threshold, so it is necessary only to consider the intensity of the
violence.
Since 2011, the US has carried out 27 drone strikes against al-Shabaab327 but, as
stated previously,328 the actions of a single party cannot, in and of themselves,
321 Byrne (2016), p. 117.
322 Rogin, ‘Somali President Asks for More American Help’, Foreign Policy (18 January 2013), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/18/somali-president-asks-for-more-american-help/.
323 Two against Ahmed Abdi Godane and one against Abu Ubaidah, both of whom were leaders of al-
Shabaab from Somalia: TBIJ Somalia, above n. 275.
324 Ibid.
325 Pantucci and Sayyid, ‘Foreign Fighters in Somalia and al-Shabaab’s Internal Purge’ (Jamestown
Foundation: Terrorism Monitor, 2013), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%
5Btt_news%5D=41705#.Vvz1y5MrKRs.
326 TBIJ Somalia, above n. 275.
327 Ibid.
328 See above, Sect. 3.3.3 AQAP and the US.
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satisfy the intensity threshold of a NIAC. Al-Shabaab has engaged in international
acts of violence, but these have primarily been in Kenya, and none have been
against the US. The only instances of actions taken by al-Shabaab against the US
have been its defence against an aborted Navy SEAL attack upon one of the group’s
commanders,329 and an al-Shabaab video that called for ‘lone wolf’ attacks to be
carried out in shopping centres in the US, Canada and the UK, though the threat was
described as not credible.330 Therefore it is impossible to conclude that there is a
NIAC between al-Shabaab and the US.
A lack of information as to the identities and nationalities of those killed makes it
difficult at this stage to confirm with certainty which drone strikes occurred within a
NIAC, though some conclusions can be made. It is likely that all six strikes prior to
2013 were within a NIAC. After 2013, three were not within the NIAC absent
additional consent, as they have been confirmed to have targeted Somalis. A further
three are probably outside of a NIAC, again absent additional consent, as they
targeted so many individuals in one instance as to have made it highly likely that
Somalis would be killed. Finally, the remaining 15 may have been carried out
within the NIAC, though if it transpires that Somali nationals were targeted then
these too will fall outside the NIAC. Therefore, once again it is clear that the
presumption that IHL applies to drone strikes in Yemen, manifest within US
documents classifying these regions as ‘outside areas of active hostilities’, is
mistaken.
4 Conclusion
This in-depth application of the law governing the classification of armed conflict to
the facts of covert US drone strikes has demonstrated that these operations have
been carried out both during periods of NIAC and periods which cannot be
classified as such. Adopting an objective view of the facts surrounding particular
drone campaigns, it has been possible to determine when situations became NIAC
and therefore periods during which the lawfulness of drone strikes should be
analyzed using IHRL interpreted with reference to IHL and when, conversely, they
should be analyzed according to the ordinary meaning of IHRL obligations.
Therefore, it is incorrect to presumptively identify IHL as being the relevant
paradigm for the analysis of these strikes, as has been done by the US through its
designation of their having occurred ‘outside areas of active hostilities’. This phrase
has no impact upon the character of the fighting to which it applies, and therefore
has no bearing on the legal paradigm applicable.
From a purely technical legal perspective, viewing the drone programmes in
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia as a whole, it has been possible to produce an overall
picture of the extent to which drone strikes have been undertaken within armed
329 Austin, ‘SEAL Somalia Target Named as ‘‘Ikrima’’ as Questions Remain About Aborted Mission’,
NBC News (New York 7 October 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/seal-somalia-target-
named-ikrima-questions-remain-about-aborted-mission-f8C11349411.
330 Karimi and others, ‘Al-Shabaab Threatens Malls, Including Some in US: FBI Plays Down Threat’,
CNN (22 February 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/21/us/al-shabaab-calls-for-mall-attacks/.
Drone Use ‘Outside Areas of Active Hostilities’
123
conflict. It is submitted that, by July 2016, 515 strikes appear likely to have been
undertaken as part of a NIAC and so may be judged according to IHRL interpreted
in light of IHL. Conversely, 46 drone strikes are very likely to have been undertaken
outside of NIACs and so their lawfulness must be assessed through the lens of IHRL
alone and its attendant restrictions on the use of lethal force. There are 88 other
strikes for which the answer is unclear, though a conclusion may be found if the
nationality of those targeted can be confirmed (Somalia), if their militant affiliation
can be determined (Pakistan) and if the law on the end of NIAC can be clarified
(Yemen).
The fact that determinations can be made as to the existence of NIAC in regions
classified as ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ demonstrates the continued
relevance of the international law governing the application of IHL. The framework
is certainly not straightforward—particularly in terms of the end of NIAC—but it is
submitted that it can nonetheless be successfully applied to the facts of modern and
ultra-asymmetrical confrontations between NSAs and technologically advanced
States. Thus there is no practical need to move away from this method of classifying
conflicts. The system of identifying armed conflicts should be continued to be used
and should certainly not be replaced with the use of obfuscatory phrases and the
presumptive application of IHL in order to expedite the permissible use of military
force and undermine relevant IHRL protections.
More generally, it has been shown that the concept of operations ‘outside areas of
active hostilities’ is devoid of normative content in law. Its use by the US centres on
the presumptive application of IHL to situations in which drones have been used, in
a manner irreconcilable with the objective identification of relevant legal paradigms
that is clearly required by international law. Furthermore, the designation of a
region as being ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ also provides no basis for IHL to
be applied outside of armed conflict, for instance, in the form of ‘self-defence
targeting’, and it should not be regarded as having such a capacity. It is submitted
that these approaches to the application of IHL must be resisted as they greatly
undermine the protections of those affected by uses of force. Armed conflict, and the
higher levels of force that are permitted as a consequence of the operationalization
of IHL, must remain exceptional, and should not be allowed to become normalized
by being presumed to exist.
The presumptive application of IHL in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia is not only
contrary to the law governing the identification of armed conflict, it also goes
counter to the global trend surrounding the regulation of hostilities towards the
increased expansion of IHRL obligations into armed conflict. It has been
convincingly articulated by Daragh Murray and others that situations of armed
conflict that are not ‘active hostilities’ will be governed by IHRL as the primary
framework of international law.331 Under this approach, far from opening up the
scope for permissive uses of force, classifying a situation as not ‘active hostilities’
would prohibit certain targeting practices that characterize US drone programmes,
such as status-based targeting.332 It is therefore possible that the methods of combat
331 Murray (2017), pp. 90–91.
332 Ibid., p. 91.
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permitted by US policy on operations ‘outside areas of active hostilities’, which are
more restricted than those available under IHL normally,333 may ultimately be
unlawful in some cases, by virtue of the very fact that they are conducted ‘outside
areas of active hostilities’, therefore rendering IHRL the primary paradigm. This is
an enticing line of argument and is one that must be pursued in the future.
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